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Moving Beyond Causes: Optimality Models and Scientific Explanation

Collin Rice
Lycoming College

Abstract. A prominent approach to scientific explanation and modeling claims
that for a model to provide an explanation it must accurately represent at least
some of the actual causes in the event’s causal history. In this paper, I argue that
many optimality explanations present a serious challenge to this causal approach.
I contend that many optimality models provide highly idealized equilibrium
explanations that do not accurately represent the causes of their target system(s).
Furthermore, in many contexts, it is in virtue of their independence of causes that
optimality models are able to provide a better explanation than competing causal
models. Consequently, our account of explanation and modeling must expand
beyond the causal approach.

1. Introduction.
Recently philosophers of science have begun to pay more attention to the building of idealized
mathematical models (Batterman 2002a, 2002b, 2009; Bueno and Colyvan 2011; Odenbaugh,
2005; Pincock 2007a, 2011, 2012; Rice 2012; Weisberg 2007). An important example of
idealized mathematical modeling is the widespread use of optimality models in biology and
economics.1 A prominent approach to scientific explanation claims that for a model to provide an
explanation it must accurately represent causes of the explanandum (Craver 2006; Hitchcock and
Woodward 2003; Kaplan and Craver 2011; Lewis 1986; Railton 1981; Salmon 1984; Strevens
2004, 2009; Woodward 2003).2 Indeed, most philosophical accounts of how explanation works
are explicitly causal. In this paper, I argue that the explanations provided by many optimality
models present a serious challenge to this causal approach.
Since Hempel (1965) it has been widely accepted that a necessary condition for
something to count as a scientific explanation is that it be (at least in some sense) true. A version
of this requirement is present in contemporary causal theories of explanation (Lewis 1986;
Salmon 1984; Strevens 2004, 2009; Woodward 2003). For these theories, to explain an event is
1

to accurately represent some of the actual causes (or causal mechanisms) in the event’s causal
history.3 This striving for accurate representation of salient causes is also present in a prominent
approach to using models as explanations (Craver 2006; Kaplan and Craver 2011; Potochnik
2007; Strevens 2009). For causal accounts, in order for a model to provide a satisfactory
explanation it must provide a veridical representation of the salient causes of the target
system(s). As Michael Strevens asserts, “no causal account of explanation—certainly not the
kairetic account—allows non-veridical models to explain” (Strevens 2009, 320).4 In addition,
Kaplan and Craver argue that, “to explain the phenomenon, the model must…reveal the causal
structure of the mechanism” (Kaplan and Craver 2011, 605). Indeed, this veridical representation
requirement is made explicit in their model-mechanism-mapping (or 3M) requirement for
explanatory models (Kaplan 2011; Kaplan and Craver 2011). According to this approach, the
explanatory power of a model comes from its accurate representation of these salient causes.5
Therefore, idealizations that distort or eliminate difference-making (or otherwise contextually
relevant) causes may be justified pragmatically, but should ultimately be removed from the best
explanation of a phenomenon.6
In contrast, other philosophers have recently argued that idealization and abstraction
sometimes play an important role in scientific explanations precisely because they remove—or
abstract away from—the various causal details of a system in order to capture the dominant (and
sometimes noncausal) features that are responsible for a phenomenon (Batterman 2002b, 2009,
2010; Huneman 2010; Rice 2012; Weslake 2010). The goal of this approach is not to provide an
accurate representation of any actual causes or causal mechanisms, but rather to utilize idealized
mathematical models and complex derivation techniques in order to capture the dominant, and
sometimes noncausal, features of the system(s) responsible for the explanandum. According to
this view, sometimes a highly idealized model that does not accurately represent a system’s
causal details, “can better explain and characterize the dominant features of the physical
phenomenon of interest. That is to say, these idealized models better explain than more detailed,
less idealized models” (Batterman 2009, 429).7 According to this approach, idealizations that
distort or omit a system’s causally relevant details can make important contributions to the
model’s ability to provide a particular kind of explanation. In other words, sometimes a model is
a better explanation in virtue of, rather than in spite of, its being highly idealized and providing
little (if any) accurate information about causes.
2

In this paper, I argue that many optimality explanations present a serious challenge to the
causal approach. I contend that many optimality models provide explanations that do not
accurately represent the difference-making (or otherwise relevant) causes of their target
system(s). Indeed, the key features of optimality explanations move the model in the opposite
direction suggested by the causal approach by eliminating (or drastically distorting) many of the
target system’s causally relevant details. To be clear, I will not be arguing against the claim that
many (if not most) explanations in science are causal explanations. Nor will I argue that
optimality models cannot be used to provide causal explanations. Rather, I will argue that often
the way in which scientists use optimality models to provide explanations is in conflict with the
requirements of causal approaches to explanation. Unfortunately, I believe philosophers have
often inappropriately attempted to apply their primarily a priori approaches to explanation to
these unique instances in biology rather than first considering how these models are actually used
by scientists to provide explanations. Therefore, my approach will be to first analyze scientists’
use of optimality models independent of any particular theory of explanation and then investigate
how these cases fit with our current philosophical theories of explanation. For purposes of space,
I will restrict my discussion to examples of optimality explanations from biology. Although I
believe many of the claims made in this paper can be applied to optimality explanations within
other disciplines (e.g. economics), because there are some important differences, a detailed
analysis of those cases will have to be provided elsewhere.
The next section outlines some basic features of the explanations provided by optimality
models. Then Section 3 presents examples of how scientists use optimality models to explain
biological phenomena. From these examples, I identify three key features of an optimality
explanation: equilibrium, idealization, and synchronic representation of structural features. Then,
in Sections 4, 5 and 6, I argue that these three components contribute to the explanation in virtue
of eliminating or distorting many of the causally relevant details of the target system(s). In
addition, I will argue that optimality models provide highly idealized equilibrium explanations,
even though they do not accurately represent the salient causes of the explanandum.
Furthermore, in many instances, a model that accurately represented causes would actually
provide a worse (or perhaps no) explanation. As a result, our account of explanation and
modeling must expand beyond the causal approach. The final section provides some suggestions
for how this expanded account can be formulated.
3

2. The Core Components of an Optimality Explanation.
Optimality models are distinguished by their use of a mathematical technique called
Optimization Theory, whose goal is to identify which values of some control variable(s) will
optimize the value of some design variable(s) in light of some design constraints (Beatty 1980;
Maynard Smith 1978; Seger and Stubblefield 1996). An optimality model specifies a constrained
set of possible strategies known as the strategy set. The design variables to be optimized
constitute the model’s currency.8 An optimality model also specifies what it means to optimize
these design variables (e.g. should a design variable be maximized or minimized). This is
referred to as the model’s optimization criterion.
Once the strategy set and optimization criterion have been identified, an optimality model
describes an objective function, which connects each possible strategy to values of the design
variable(s) to be optimized.9 These equations will build in various context-specific design
constraints and tradeoffs among the quantities represented within the model. For example, when
building a bridge there may be several design features to be optimized—e.g. weight, width, cost
etc. Yet, not all of these can be optimized simultaneously; certain tradeoffs (e.g. more width will
require more weight and cost) and context-specific limitations (e.g. limited funds) will constrain
the optimal design. These constraints and tradeoffs are built into the optimality model’s objective
function (or strategy set).
Once these components are specified, one can deduce which of the available strategies
will yield the optimal value(s) of the design variable(s). The strategy that optimizes the model’s
criterion, in light of various constraints and tradeoffs, is deemed the optimal strategy. By
mathematically representing the important constraints and tradeoffs, an optimality model can
demonstrate why a particular strategy is the best available solution.
Now that we understand what an optimality model is, we can turn to the question of how
an optimality model might be used to provide an explanation. The main thing to note is that
merely showing that a strategy is the best available is insufficient to provide a satisfactory
explanation. Therefore, if an optimality model is going to provide a satisfactory explanation of
biological explananda—e.g. the current trait distribution of a biological population—the model
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must also include assumptions about why the optimal strategy is to be expected. I refer to these
additional assumptions as optimization assumptions.
In biology, optimality models usually provide a species of equilibrium explanation
(Sober 1983).10 For instance, in biology, an optimality model is often taken to explain the current
state of the population by showing that the optimal strategy is (or is related to) the evolving
system’s equilibrium point. In the simplest cases, we can identify which of the available
strategies will maximize some currency; e.g. fitness. In these “frequency-independent” cases, it is
assumed that the system will tend to increase the model’s currency; thereby making the strategy
that maximizes the model’s currency an equilibrium point. However, sometimes the optimal
strategy will depend on what strategies other individuals in the population are playing (or the
population as a whole).11 In these frequency-dependent cases, game-theoretic techniques must be
used (Lewontin 1961; Maynard Smith 1982). Here, the model’s optimization assumptions will
aim to show that the optimal strategy (or distribution of strategies) is an evolutionarily stable
equilibrium, but this stable state may not maximize the model’s currency.12
In either case, in order to provide a satisfactory explanation, an optimality model must:
(1) accurately represent the salient constraints and tradeoffs of the target system(s) and, (2) make
accurate optimization assumptions about the target system.13 Precisely which aspects of these
features need to be accurately represented (and to what degree) to provide an explanation will
depend on the explanatory interests of the modeler (Matthewson and Weisberg 2009). Given this
context specificity, I will simply say that an optimality model can provide a sufficient
explanation when it adequately captures these aspects of the physical system to the degree
dictated by the explanatory context.
Several accounts connect explanation with some notion of expectability (Hempel 1965;
Salmon 1984; Strevens 2009; Batterman 2002). That is, an explanans explains the explanandum
in part because it allows us to see why the explanandum was expected to occur. This minimal—
though by no means sufficient—requirement for being an explanation provides some insight into
why optimality models are able to provide satisfactory explanations. An optimality model uses
mathematical representations to demonstrate that a particular strategy (or set of strategies) is the
best available given certain constraints and tradeoffs—i.e., the mathematical model demonstrates
why a particular strategy is locally optimal. The optimization assumptions then show why the
5

target system is expected to arrive at (and perhaps maintain) the optimal strategy. However, I
will argue below that many optimality models are able to satisfy these requirements without
accurately representing causes of the target explanandum.
3. Examples of Optimality Explanations.
In this section I present two examples in order to illustrate how biologists use optimality models
to provide explanations.14 Each example is representative of a larger class of optimality
explanations commonly found in biology. In light of these examples, I identify three key features
of an optimality explanation: equilibrium, idealization, and synchronic mathematical
representations of structural features. In the following sections I analyze the contributions these
features make to the explanation provided by the optimality model.
3.1. A Frequency-Independent Example: Parker’s Dung Flies.
Biological optimality models typically assume that natural selection will maximize the model’s
criterion; e.g. fitness or its proxy. Furthermore, these models commonly assume that natural
selection will be able to overcome any other evolutionary factors; e.g. drift. These optimization
assumptions entail that the strategy that maximizes the model’s currency is the equilibrium point
of the evolving population. Another important feature of biological optimality models is that they
are usually intended to be adaptive explanations of population-level explananda—e.g. why this
population has evolved the adaptive trait it has.15
As an example, G. A. Parker utilized an optimality model in his attempts to explain why
dung flies (Scatophaga stercoraria) copulate for 36 minutes on average (Parker 1978). Parker’s
model is an instance of a general class of biological optimality models that stems from the prey
and patch choice models used in foraging theory (Charnov 1976; Krebs 1984; Stephens and
Krebs 1986).16 These foraging models analyze the tradeoff between energy intake from the
current patch or food item and the lost opportunity to perform other foraging tasks. Parker’s
model uses this kind of analysis to calculate the optimal time for dung flies to spend copulating
given that time spent copulating is time that cannot be spent on other mating tasks.
First, Parker observed that female dung flies mate with multiple males. He then
discovered, by experimentation, that when this occurs the second male fertilizes far more eggs
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(80%) than the first (20%). Consequently, after copulating, a male spends some time guarding
the female before searching for other mates. The total behavioral cycle time is given by summing
search time, copulation time and guard time. Parker then observed that the average time spent
searching plus guarding was 156 minutes. Therefore, the total cycle will last 156 + c minutes,
where c is the amount of time spent copulating. Different values of c constitute the model’s
strategy set.
By experiment, Parker found that increasing c increases the average number of eggs
fertilized. However, there is an important tradeoff: time spent copulating is time that cannot be
spent on other parts of the mating cycle. In addition, Parker observed diminishing returns on time
spent copulating.17 These constraints and tradeoffs are captured by the mathematical curve that
represents average fertilization as a function of copulation time (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Parker’s optimality model used to investigate the copulation time of dung flies (Sober 2000).

According to Parker’s optimization criterion, the optimal value for c is the value that maximizes
the rate of eggs fertilized across several iterations of the behavioral cycle. Consequently, the
optimal strategy occurs at the point where a line that passes through the origin and intersects the
asymptotic curve with the steepest slope (line A-B above) intersects the curve. This optimal
strategy occurs when c is equal to 41 minutes, which is fairly close to the observed average value
of 36 minutes. Given this predictive accuracy, and the fact that Parker’s model was based on
detailed empirical observations, the model is often thought to have captured the salient
constraints and tradeoffs involved in the selection of the trait (Sober 2000).18
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However, in order for Parker’s model to provide an explanation of the observed trait
value requires additional assumptions. First we must assume that a strategy’s fitness is strictly
increasing with increased (average) rate of egg fertilization—i.e. we must assume that Parker’s
optimization criterion is accurate. Furthermore, we require assumptions that eliminate the
influence of other evolutionary factors; e.g. drift or genetic constraints. These assumptions are
captured in various idealizations within the optimality model. For example, in order to eliminate
drift the model assumes that the population is infinite. Other idealizations—e.g. assuming that
phenotypes are inherited perfectly by offspring—result in the elimination of other evolutionary
factors. These optimization assumptions entail that the optimal strategy identified by the model is
the equilibrium point of the system. In this way, Parker’s model can be used to provide an
equilibrium explanation for why dung flies copulate for approximately 36 minutes on average.19
3.2. Explaining General Patterns: Equilibrium Sex Ratios.
In addition to explaining system-specific phenomena, optimality models are frequently used to
explain highly general patterns. For example, life-history models investigate the optimal lifetime
reproductive effort across widely heterogeneous populations (Williams 1966; Charnov et. al.
2007). Another commonly referenced group of biological optimality models comes from the
theory of sex allocation (Charnov 1982; Fisher 1930; Hamilton 1967; Maynard Smith 1982;
Maynard Smith and Price 1976). Although there are numerous examples to choose from, for my
purposes, it is sufficient to consider Fisher’s original (1930) model of equilibrium sex ratios.
Although Fisher’s model has been expanded (and criticized) in numerous ways, the general
structure of the optimality explanation of a general pattern remains the same. The important
point is that Fisher asked a very general biological why question: why is the sex ratio often 1:1?
In Fisher’s model the strategy set includes all the possible points on a continuum from
producing only male offspring to producing only female offspring. He used a simple frequencydependent optimality model to demonstrate that if the sex ratio were controlled by phenotypic
strategies played by parents (which are assumed to be directly determined by their genes), the
stable equilibrium sex ratio would be 1:1.
In rough outline, Fisher’s model claims the following. Fisher reasoned that if one sex is
more common in the population, there will be a fitness payoff to parents who produce the
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minority sex since their children will have more mating opportunities. To see this, suppose that
male births are less common than female births. A newborn male thus has better mating
prospects than a newborn female and is, therefore, expected to have more offspring on average.
Therefore, parents who produce males tend to have more grandchildren on average.
Consequently, male births will become more common in the population. However, as the
population approaches a 1:1 ratio, this fitness advantage fades away. The exact same reasoning
applies if we assume that female births are less common. The only state in which selection will
not favor the production of the minority sex is when the sex ratio is 1:1. Therefore, a 1:1 sex
ratio is the stable equilibrium state of the evolving population.
Fisher’s model relies on a key tradeoff between the ability to produce sons and daughters.
This tradeoff is described by looking at what economists refer to as the substitution cost. In this
case, the substitution cost tells us how many sons can be produced if one less daughter is
produced. In Fisher’s model this tradeoff is perfectly linear—i.e. males and females cost the
same amount of resources to produce and so one fewer son means one more daughter and vice
versa. This is why his model predicts a 1:1 sex ratio. Charnov (1982, 28-9) shows that
generalizing Fisher’s model leads to the conclusion that the equilibrium ratio of a population, r,
can be calculated using the following formula:
r = C2/(C1 + C2)
Where C1 is the average resource cost of one son and C2 is the average resource cost of one
daughter. In other words, the equilibrium sex ratio for the population is determined by the
substitution cost, C2/C1; i.e., a parent can have one daughter, or C2/C1 sons. Therefore, the
tradeoff between utilizing resources to produce sons and daughters is the key to explaining the
equilibrium sex ratio.
In order for these models to provide an explanation, we must assume that natural
selection will optimize the model’s criterion—e.g., mating opportunities. Additionally, the
models assume that other evolutionary factors (e.g. drift) will not deter the population from
reaching the equilibrium favored by natural selection. In order to derive this result, these models
usually make the idealizing assumptions that organisms reproduce asexually, mate randomly,
each have equal access to resources for investing in offspring, the population is infinite in size,
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etc.20 As I will argue below, abstracting away from these heterogeneous details is key to
providing an explanation of the kind of general biological pattern Fisher was interested in.
3.3. The Key Features of Optimality Explanations.
These examples are certainly insufficient to provide an account of all optimality modeling in
biology. Still, in light of these examples, we can identify three key features common to most
optimality explanations. First, these models usually provide a type of equilibrium explanation.
Second, these models are typically highly idealized. Third, most of the explanatory work in these
models is done by synchronic mathematical representations of structural features of the system.
According to the causal approach, in order to provide an explanation a model must
accurately represent the (contextually or metaphysically) salient causes of, or causal mechanisms
that gave rise to, the explanandum (Craver 2007; Lewis 1986; Railton 1981; Salmon 1984;
Strevens 2004, 2009; Woodward 2003). However, in what follows I will argue that the key
features of optimality explanations (those listed above) move the model in the opposite direction
suggested by the causal approach. In addition, I will argue that these models are able to provide
explanations despite the fact that they do not accurately represent causes of the explanandum.
4. Equilibrium Explanation.
Most of the optimality models in biology are used to provide equilibrium explanations. Part of
what is explanatory about this kind of equilibrium model is that it allows us to understand that no
matter what the particular causal trajectory of the population had been, within a certain
disjunction of possible causal trajectories, the ultimate result would have been the equilibrium
state. That is, the model tells us that a wide range of potential causal trajectories would all yield
the same result, but it does not tell us which one is the actual causal trajectory or initial state of
the target system (Sober 1983).
One way to understand the explanatory power of this kind of equilibrium explanation is
that we know that the actual causal trajectory of the system is within the disjunction of
possibilities that the model shows will lead to the same equilibrium. Michael Strevens argues
that an equilibrium explanation of a ball’s arriving at the bottom of a basin is causal in this way.
He says, “But it is not true that the explanation says nothing at all about the ball’s starting point
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and trajectory. It identifies the starting point as one of a large class, namely, all starting points at
the basin’s lip, and likewise identifies the trajectory as one of an equally large class” (Strevens
2009, 288). It is true that the equilibrium model gives us some minimal information about the
actual causal history of the system by telling us it is within the disjunction of causal trajectories
that would lead to the explanandum. However, I maintain that grounding the model’s
explanatory power in this minimal information about the actual causes is a mistake. For one
thing, it suggests that a model that provided additional information about the actual causes would
provide a superior explanation. Indeed, Strevens claims that models in ecology and economics
that “black-box” the dynamics of underlying causal mechanisms are at best partial explanations.
He says, “Because a model that secretes some mechanisms in its explanatory framework does
not confer…‘deep’ or ‘full’ understanding of the phenomenon...the black-boxing model is
limited in its explanatory power. A deep explanation…must flesh out the model’s black boxes
rather than leaving the causal details in the framework” (Strevens 2009, 169).21 Other causal
accounts of explanation also favor explanations that fill in the details of micro-level causal
mechanisms (e.g. see Kaplan and Craver 2011 and Kaplan 2011).
In contrast, I maintain that there are several reasons for preferring the kind of equilibrium
explanations provided by optimality models in virtue of the fact that they do not cite the actual
causal trajectories or mechanisms of particular systems (Batterman 2002b; Garfinkel 1981;
Pincock 2007b, 2011; Weslake 2010). One reason is that citing the actual causal trajectory (or
mechanisms) of a particular system means that the optimality model is unable to apply to other
systems subject to similar constraints and tradeoffs, but which are heterogeneous in these causes.
Many philosophers have recognized the explanatory value of this kind of modal information
(Garfinkel 1981; Jackson and Pettit 1992; Woodward 2003). By moving away from the actual
causes of any particular system (or set of systems), the optimality model is able to capture a
wider range of possible systems that are extremely heterogeneous in their causes.
Here, I do not intend to suggest that an explanation’s applying to more possible systems
is always objectively better.22 Rather, I agree with Elliott Sober that the preference for generality
or detail is largely a matter of our explanatory interests (Sober 1999). However, in many cases
the generality provided by optimality models’ exclusion of causal details is what we want.
Indeed, sometimes the generality of the explanandum requires an explanation that is independent
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of the initial conditions and causal trajectories of particular systems. For example, in order to
explain evolutionary patterns across causally heterogeneous populations—e.g. the frequency of
the 1:1 sex ratio—often the causal details of particular systems need to be eliminated.
In addition, the explanations provided by optimality models are extremely enlightening
precisely because they are independent of information about the actual causal trajectories of
particular systems, not in spite of this feature. For one thing, it is an important explanatory piece
of information that the particular initial conditions and causal trajectory are not required for the
target explanandum to occur. As Jackson and Pettit (1992, 177) put it, the explanation tells us
that, “if the actual history described by the microcausal explanation had not obtained, the
explanandum would still have occurred.”23 Similarly, when discussing Fisher’s model, Elliott
Sober claims, "Where causal explanation shows how the event to be explained was in fact
produced, equilibrium explanation shows how the event would have occurred regardless of
which of a variety of causal scenarios actually transpired" (Sober 1983, 202). Although the
actual causal trajectory of the system includes many difference-making (i.e. causally relevant)
causal factors, the optimality model explains without referencing those causes. Instead, the
optimality model provides us with an important piece of explanatory information: the initial
conditions and causal trajectory of the target system are not important for understanding why
the target explanandum occurred because several different causal histories would have led to the
same outcome. In this way, the optimality model provides additional explanatory information
that would not be captured by a model that accurately represented the causal trajectories or initial
conditions of particular systems.
Eliminating these causal details also allows our explanation to focus on the features of the
target system(s) that are essential for understanding the target phenomenon. Once we understand
that the particular initial conditions and causal trajectory of the system are not important, we can
better appreciate the things that really matter: the structural constraints and tradeoffs that the
optimality model mathematically represents and the optimization assumptions used to deduce the
target explanandum. Therefore, in some instances, optimality models’ elimination of causally
relevant details allows them to provide a better explanation than models that would “fill in the
details” of the actual causes.
5. Idealizations in Optimality Explanations.
12

Yet even though optimality explanations do not reference the actual initial conditions or causal
trajectory of their target system(s), they may still provide a different type of causal explanation
by accurately representing some causal mechanisms (or processes) that gave rise to the
explanandum. That is, the model may not tell us precisely how the causal history actually
proceeded, but may still accurately represent some of the causal relationships (e.g. mechanisms)
responsible for the explanandum.24 However, even if optimality models can be shown to be a
kind of causal model, they will almost always fail to meet the veridical standards required by
causal approaches to explanation. This is due to the fact that optimality explanations are almost
always so highly idealized that they fail to accurately represent the (salient) causes of their
target system(s).
To begin, biological optimality model’s mathematical representations of constraints and
tradeoffs are often inaccurate when compared to the causal mechanisms acting within the
population. For example, in Parker’s model the assumption is that average fertilization rate
increases with increased time spent copulating according to a perfectly asymptotic curve. In
addition, many game-theoretic models assume that a conflict is symmetric or that payoffs are
constant across iterations of the game in order to use certain mathematical operations required to
deduce the equilibrium state (see Hammerstein and Selten 1994 for some examples). But these
smooth curves and constant parameters will almost always be inaccurate when compared with
the causal mechanisms acting within the model’s target system(s).25
Next, the strategy sets of most optimality models do not accurately represent the set of
strategies actually causally interacting within the system.26 The model’s strategy set, however, is
not intended to accurately represent the strategies that were causally interacting in the
population, but merely aims to capture the relevant set of alternative strategies for the
optimization problem. For instance, although a sex ratio model may assume that the strategy set
includes all the probabilities that a birth will be a male, this is not intended to claim that in the
target population there were individuals playing this range of strategies. Rather, the model
assumes that the optimal strategy will evolve regardless of which particular distribution of
strategies was actually causally interacting within the population’s history (as long as this set
includes the optimal strategy). The actual strategies are, however, causally relevant to the
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evolutionary process that occurred. This causal information, however, is explicitly not included
in the explanation provided by the optimality model.
In addition, a biological model’s optimization assumptions are almost always inaccurate
when compared with a population’s causal mechanisms—even if we consider causal
mechanisms at the level of the population. For instance, in foraging models it is often assumed
that natural selection will maximize average energy intake. However, this is only one thing that
might influence the survival and reproduction of organisms in the population. In fact, the various
causal mechanisms (or more generally natural selection) acting in the population often will not
optimize the model’s criterion. Therefore, in most cases, the optimization process described by
the optimality model will not accurately represent any actual causal process (or mechanism) of
the target system. The goal of a biological optimality explanation, however, is not to accurately
describe the causal dynamics that led to the evolution of a trait. Rather, biological optimality
models identify optimal strategies (or states) that are only outcomes or end states of an evolving
system that approximates their optimization assumptions in the long run. To borrow a weighted
phrase from economics, a model’s optimization assumptions are usually taken to be adequate as
long as the system behaves “as if” it where optimizing the model’s criterion. Therefore,
optimality models are frequently used to explain why a system has evolved the optimal strategy
regardless of whether their optimization assumptions are true of the causal processes acting in
the system at any point along the way to that strategy.
Next, many biological optimality models use idealizations concerning the way in which
phenotypic strategies are inherited; e.g. that strategies are inherited perfectly by offspring. These
idealizations are introduced because it is assumed that changing these inheritance assumptions
will have no effect on the occurrence of the phenomenon. In other words, the actual causal
processes that underlie these kinds of inheritance assumptions are not important for
understanding why the phenomenon occurred. Therefore, we can ignore these causes, or at least
specify them inaccurately, without our model losing any explanatory power. However, the
causes underlying these inheritance assumptions are important difference-makers in the
explanandum’s causal history in at least one sense—without some causal process of inheritance
nothing would have evolved. Nevertheless, an accurate representation of these causes is not
required for the optimality model to explain the target phenomenon.
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Another idealization is the assumption that environmental pressures are constant. This
idealization is required in order for the optimal strategy to be an obtainable equilibrium state—
i.e. the population needs time to arrive at the predicted optima before changes in environmental
conditions alter the equilibrium point of the system. However, the causal selection pressures in a
population are never constant in this way. Therefore, this idealization grossly distorts the causal
mechanisms actually influencing the selection of the trait. However, accurately representing
these causal mechanisms is not important to the explanation provided by the optimality model.
Finally, most biological optimality models assume that the population being modeled is
infinite (or effectively infinite). However, population size does make a difference to every
evolutionary process; i.e., drift is a statistical fact of every real-world biological population.
Assuming infinite population size has the effect of eliminating drift from the model by utilizing
various laws of large numbers. By incorporating the idealization of infinite population size, the
optimal trait according to natural selection is what we expect to evolve. Therefore, this
idealization, like many of the others, is vital to the optimality model’s explanation—without it
the features of the model do not entail the occurrence of the explanandum. However, once again,
this idealization eliminates (or drastically distorts) the causal mechanisms (or processes)
operating within the model’s target population(s).27
In sum, I have identified six kinds of idealizations frequently utilized in biological
optimality explanations:
(1) The model’s mathematical curves, equations, or payoff structures are often idealized when
compared to the causal processes within the target system(s)).
(2) Idealized strategy sets are intended to capture the relevant alternatives rather than strategies
actually causally interacting within a population.
(3) The models’ optimization assumptions do not accurately represent a causal mechanism in the
system, but only captures the general optimizing tendency of the system in the long run.
(4) There are idealizations regarding causal mechanisms of inheritance.
(5) It is assumed that selection pressures do not change over time.
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(6) Infinite population size is assumed to allow for the use of various laws of large numbers in
deducing the target explanandum.
When considered together, these idealizations entail that optimality models usually
provide little, if any, accurate information about the actual causes, or causal mechanisms, within
the model’s target system(s). In the end, the highly idealized optimality model represents
mathematical relationships between constraints, tradeoffs, and the system’s equilibrium point
that do not mirror any causal relationships (or processes) in the target system. Put different,
optimality models fail the kind of “model-to-mechanism-mapping requirement” of causal
theories that requires that the “dependencies…among variables in the model correspond to
the…causal relations among the components of the target mechanism” (Kaplan and Craver 2011,
611).
The key point here is to recognize that rather than omitting irrelevant causal factors so
that we can focus on those causes that make a difference—as say Strevens’s (2009) account of
idealization would have it—I argue that these idealizations considered collectively move us away
from attempting to accurately represent causes at all towards a representation of relationships
that do not mirror any of the causal relationships within the model’s target system(s).
In a similar way, James Woodward describes how the ideal gas law, “Abstracts radically
from the details of the causal processes involving particular individual molecules and instead
focuses on identifying high-level variables that aggregate over many individual causal processes
that figure in the general patterns that govern the behavior of the gas” (Woodward 2003, 354). In
addition to abstracting radically from individual-level causal processes, I argue that optimality
models are typically so idealized that they provide little (if any) accurate information about any
of the causes within the model’s target system(s)—even if we consider causes at the “macro”
level. Instead, the key relationships (what Woodward calls patterns involving high-level
variables) that are the focus of many highly idealized optimality models do not correspond to
causal relationships within the model’s target system(s).
Moreover, many optimality models utilize idealizations that appear to play essential roles
within their explanations. Robert Batterman (2002, 2009, 2010) has recently described similar
cases in physics. According to Batterman, idealizations that introduce limits are sometimes
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essential to an explanation because they allow for certain mathematical operations to be
performed that would not otherwise apply. In many cases, however, the explanation can only be
provided by the idealized model—lose the idealizations and you lose the explanation. Similarly,
the explanations provided by at least many optimality models require that certain idealizations be
introduced in order to employ certain mathematical techniques used to derive the target
explanandum. For instance, the biological examples described above used the idealizing
assumptions that the population is infinite, organisms mate randomly, phenotypic strategies are
inherited perfectly, etc. Without these idealizations, the features represented in the mathematical
model are insufficient for deriving the target explanandum. Even more idealizations are required
in many game-theoretic explanations of highly general biological patterns. Therefore, for many
optimality explanations it is unclear how the various idealizations could be removed from the
model without consequently eliminating the explanation being offered.
By moving away from (even attempting to provide) an accurate representation of causes
we are able to provide an explanation that applies to systems in which these causes are different.
That is, by introducing various idealizations that distort or eliminate the causal details of
particular systems, we are able to provide an explanation that captures a wider range of possible
systems.28 In addition, this kind of explanation is precisely what is required in order to explain
highly general patterns that range over systems that are heterogeneous in most of their causal
details. In order to explain biological patterns often requires assumptions that move us away
from the heterogeneous causes of particular systems.
In addition, by showing that the causes of particular systems are irrelevant, the
explanation of the highly idealized optimality model contains explanatory information about
what is not required for the occurrence of the explanandum. Indeed, these idealizations are often
introduced because the various causes of particular target systems are not important to the
explanation provided by the optimality model. In other words, these idealizations make essential
contributions to the explanation provided by an optimality model because they show why most (if
not all) of a system’s causal factor(s), mechanism(s), or variable(s) are not important for
understanding why the explanandum occurred. Although many of these details are relevant to
the veridical causal explanation, they are not required for the optimality model to explain the
phenomenon—this is because extremely different physical causes would have been sufficient so
long as the constraints, tradeoffs, and optimization assumptions of the optimality model are
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satisfied. This modal (i.e. counterfactual) information is key to explaining many of the
explananda we observe (e.g. repeatable patterns) since it shows us why extremely heterogeneous
causal systems will nevertheless display similar behavior.
What is more, these idealizations again aid our grasping of the key structural
relationships that are important for understanding the phenomenon. By moving away from the
causes of the model’s target system(s) we are able to see how the dominant constraints and
tradeoffs of the target system(s) are responsible for the explanandum. The relevance of these
features is demonstrated by providing counterfactual information about how the system would
behave if these structural relationships had been different in various ways. In this way, if an
optimality model adequately captures the dominant structural features (to the degree dictated by
the context), the model can provide a highly idealized equilibrium explanation despite the fact
that it fails to accurately represent the causes of its target system(s).
6. Synchronic Mathematical Representations of Structural Features.
A third essential component of an optimality explanation is the mathematical representation of
structural constraints and tradeoffs. The optimality model explains by showing how the
equilibrium point of the system is counterfactually related to these constraints and tradeoffs; i.e.
the model shows how changing the constraints or tradeoffs results in a change in the predicted
outcome. These counterfactual relationships are key to the ability of these features to explain the
target phenomenon. Given these counterfactual relationships, one might argue that these
relationships are causal relationships after all since we can see how manipulating these structural
features would change the equilibrium point of the system. Consequently, optimality models
might be understood as providing a kind of (perhaps non-veridical) causal explanation. In
response to this challenge, I will argue that—independent of their ability to veridically represent
causes—when we look closer, the key counterfactual relationships within an optimality
explanation are best interpreted as noncausal relationships.
To begin, it is often difficult to see how the tradeoffs represented within optimality models
can be understood as causal relationships. For instance, in many biological optimality models,
average energy intake and average predation risk will exhibit a tradeoff that is vital to the
explanation of the observed phenotype, but it is unclear how we ought to understand the
ontological claim that average energy intake is a cause of average predation risk (or vice versa).
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Although there certainly is a “lower-level” causal story about why this tradeoff between
population-level averages holds, the biological model does not reference these causes. Instead,
the model focuses on relationships between multiply realizable features that aggregate over these
causes. Moreover, within an optimality explanation it is really the tradeoffs between variables
that are doing the key explanatory work. Indeed, as Eric Charnov claims, “the tradeoffs
themselves are the fundamental objects of evolutionary interest, at least with respect to
stabilizing or equilibrium selection” (Charnov 1989, 115). This is precisely why biologists have
provided detailed analyses of how “evolutionary outcomes…depend on the shape and position of
the tradeoff curves constraining the course of evolution” (de Mazancourt and Dieckmann 2004,
769).29 In other words, it is in some sense the syntactic features (i.e. the relationships between
variables), rather than the semantic features (i.e. the variables themselves) that do the explaining.
However, even if two variables are causes, this does not entail that the tradeoff that exists
between them is a cause. Indeed, it would be rather puzzling to claim, for example, that the
population-level tradeoff between average energy intake and average predation risk is a cause of
anything. In short, it is extremely difficult to see how our metaphysical intuitions about causes
can be codified in the case of the tradeoffs that are central to optimality explanations.
In addition, many modelers within biology (and economics) appear to be uninterested in
using their mathematical models to establish causal claims about the target system. While some
contexts will certainly require reference to causes (or causal explanations), I think it is important
to notice that scientific modelers often do not believe they require any metaphysical claims about
causation in order for their mathematical models to aid in understanding the target
phenomenon.30 Indeed, I believe a welcome result of expanding beyond causal approaches to
explanation is that scientists can provide explanations without having to make any ontological
commitments about causal relationships between variables in their highly idealized models.
Still, many philosophers will remain unconvinced by these appeals to causal intuitions and
the metaphysical agnosticism of some scientific modelers. A stronger argument for the noncausal
interpretation of these relationships is that several of the key features common to causal
explanations are absent in the instance of an optimality model’s representation of tradeoffs.31
First, we can consider what Nancy Cartwright (2004) calls ‘thick’ causal concepts. After
rejecting several attempts to provide a universal account of causation, Cartwright intends these
concepts to help reveal the productive relation that is key to how causes relate to their effects.
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These concepts include pushing, feeding, opening, compressing, unwinding, bonding, etc.
However, the tradeoffs between statistical properties (e.g. averages) that often feature
prominently in optimality explanations surely cannot be described in terms of compressing,
pulling, or unwinding anything in the target system. Indeed, no such causal activity or causal
concepts are employed in the optimality model’s description of these structural features—nor
anywhere else in the model’s explanation.
Another reason to think that the constraints and tradeoffs of optimality explanations do not
represent causal relationships is that the optimality model’s mathematical representation of them
does not reference any processes, or events, that unfold prior to the explanandum. A central
feature of causal representations is that they are essentially diachronic—i.e. there is a temporal
dimension to the representation that captures changes over time. This diachronic component is
especially prominent in process and mechanistic theories of causal explanation (Craver 2006;
Kaplan and Craver 2011; Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000; Salmon 1984; Strevens 2009).
The explanation provided by an optimality model, in contrast, merely identifies the optimal
strategy by showing that the model’s currency is optimized by a particular strategy, given the
constraints and tradeoffs synchronically represented within the model. For instance, in Parker’s
model, the optimal strategy— i.e. the point at which the average rate of fertilization is
maximized—is simply represented as the value of c at which the slope of a line that intersects the
curve and passes through the origin is maximized. Nowhere does the model describe a causal
process (or causal trajectory) that unfolds over time or any events that occur prior to the
explanandum. Instead, the model merely identifies c = 41 minutes as the optimal strategy.
Furthermore, none of the points along these mathematical curves need be instantiated in order for
the model to explain the outcome. This is because, contrary to the standard way causes explain
their effects, optimality models do not provide a dynamical account of the processes or events
that led to the explanandum. Instead, these models identify optimal strategies by using
synchronic representations of structural features of the system. So although dynamics are the
main focus of causal explanations, this is precisely the kind of information that is (almost)
entirely absent from an optimality explanation.
Finally, we can consider modularity and interventions. Interventionist accounts of causal
explanation require that causes be modular in the sense that they can be manipulated
independently of other causes within the system (Woodward 1997, 2003, 2010). Yet, in evolving
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biological systems, the tradeoffs between (what are often statistical) higher-level properties of
the system usually depend on the fitnesses of individuals and these variables in turn depend on a
complex and integrated network of causal contributions to “fitness”. Moreover, in many cases,
these higher-level properties arise from complex systems whose dynamics are chaotic, nonlinear, and involve feedback loops (Mitchell 2008, 2012).32 Indeed, as Cartwright notes, in many
cases “the causal laws are harnessed together and cannot be changed singly” (Cartwright 2004,
811).33 Given the causal entanglement and complex integration of evolving biological systems, it
is unlikely that one would (even in principle) be able to intervene in such a way that changed
only a particular tradeoff’s influence on the target phenomenon. Thus, it is extremely difficult to
see how we could even in principle manipulate these tradeoffs’ influence on the equilibrium
point of the population independently of other causal factors. For instance, the key tradeoff in
Parker’s model is that time spent copulating is time that cannot be spent on other parts of the
behavioral cycle. Intervening on this tradeoff would presumably require not only altering the
causes that impinge on each individual dung fly, but also some kind of alteration to the basic
principle that time spent on one task cannot be spent on other tasks. Precisely what this kind of
(in principle) intervention would even look like is unclear.34 Instead, I maintain that the apparent
modularity of these relationships within the idealized model is merely an illusion created by the
use of several idealizations and abstractions that eliminate the complexity of the causal networks
of real-world biological systems. Modular relationships within an idealized mathematical model
cannot establish modularity of causal relationships in the model’s target system(s).35
Most importantly, however, optimality models are able to provide satisfactory explanations
without adding any claims about interventions or causation. Nowhere in the description of the
explanations above did we require any mentioning of these concepts. Indeed, additional claims
about causation would be otiose in these cases (in the same way that claims about ‘optimality’
would be useless in many causal explanations). As a result, it appears that an optimality model
need not tell us how things would have been different under an intervention in order to explain
why we observe the explanandum. Although claims about interventions may be important for
testing (or interpreting) causal claims, they are not required to establish that the explanation is
sufficient. I will say more about the possibility of discharging this requirement from our account
of explanation in the next section.
In sum, not only is it difficult to see how the relationships represented within optimality
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models can be made to square with our metaphysical intuitions about causes, but also several of
the key features of causal explanations are absent in the instance of an optimality model’s
representation of these structural features. Therefore, I conclude, the key relationships
represented within an optimality explanation are best interpreted as noncausal relationships.
Optimality models primarily focus on noncausal counterfactual relations between structural
features and the system’s equilibrium point. Moreover, these features can sometimes explain the
target phenomenon without requiring any additional causal claims about the relationships
represented in the model—i.e. the explanatory claim and the causal claim are independent of
one another.36
Indeed, an explanatory strength of many optimality models is that their descriptions of
these noncausal relationships are able to capture a range of systems that behave similarly despite
being extremely heterogeneous in their causes. This explanatory goal is made explicit by some
biological optimality modelers (Stephens and Krebs 1986).37 This generality is yielded by the
fact that the structural features represented within an optimality model are multiply realizable.
Indeed, one reason optimality models are able to explain phenomena across extremely causally
heterogeneous biological systems is because they focus on relationships that are invariant with
respect to changes in the causes of the system. Put differently, moving away from causes is often
what enables optimality models to provide the kind of explanation we seek.38
7. A Way Forward: Moving Beyond Causes.
7.1. Beyond The Causal Approach.
According to the causal approach, in order to explain an event a model must accurately represent
the salient causes of, or causal mechanisms that gave rise to, the target explanandum (Craver
2007; Kaplan and Craver 2011; Lewis 1986; Railton 1981; Salmon 1984; Strevens 2004, 2009;
Woodward 2003). This causal paradigm dominates the current discussion about explanation and
modeling.
The above analysis has identified three key features of optimality explanations:
equilibrium, idealization, and synchronic mathematical representation of structural features. I
have argued that these features contribute to the optimality explanation by moving us away from
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an accurate representation of the salient causes of the system(s). The three lines of argument that
draw upon these features can be summarized as follows:
(1)

Equilibrium explanations are often enlightening in virtue of showing us why
causal dynamics are largely irrelevant.

(2)

Highly idealized optimality models fail to meet the veridical requirements of the
causal approach because they provide little (if any) accurate information about
the causes within the model’s target system(s).

(3)

Instead of trying to accurately represent causal relationships, an optimality model
focuses on synchronically representing noncausal (counterfactual)
relationships.

In other words, the key features of an optimality explanation are ones that move the model in the
opposite direction suggested by the causal approach by eliminating many of the target system’s
causally relevant details. Furthermore, the important work in these explanations is done by the
structural relationships between a system’s constraints, tradeoffs, and optimal strategy. These
structural relationships, however, are best understood as noncausal relationships. By showing
how the equilibrium state is counterfactually related to (i.e. depends on) these multiply realizable
structural features, optimality models are able to provide an explanation that is independent of
the causes of any particular system(s).
Moreover, in some contexts, a model that accurately represented the salient causes of the
explanandum would actually provide a worse explanation. By moving away from causes, an
optimality model will often: (1) apply to more possible systems, (2) provide explanatory
information about what is not required for the explanandum, (3) provide explanatory information
about why the phenomenon would occur in other causally heterogeneous systems, and (4)
highlight the structural relationships essential to understanding why the explanandum occurred.
I conclude that optimality models provide a special kind of highly idealized equilibrium
explanation despite the fact that they do not accurately represent the causes of the explanandum.
Moreover, in many cases, it is in virtue of not accurately representing causes that optimality
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models are able to provide a better explanation than competing causal models. Consequently, our
account of explanation and modeling must expand beyond the causal approach.
7.2. A Way Forward: Batterman and Woodward.
This, of course, cannot be the end of the story. I am certainly not alone in suggesting that
noncausal features of a system can be used to provide scientific explanations (Batterman 2002b,
2005, 2009; Bokulich 2011, 2012; Matthen and Ariew 2009; Pincock 2007a, 2012; Walsh et al.
2002; Walsh 2007; 2010). However, advocates of causal accounts of explanation have provided
extended treatments of how causal explanations work. Given my conclusion, one could
reasonably complain that I have created a problem without proposing a solution. Although
providing a full account of (noncausal) explanation is beyond the scope of this paper, I do not
think the revision will need to be as drastic as it might first appear. Importantly, many of the
features of our existing accounts of explanation—e.g. counterfactuals and invariance (Woodward
2003), generality (Hitchock and Woodward 2003; Kitcher 1981; Strevens 2009), asymmetry
(Salmon 1984), truth (Hempel 1965), expectability (Batterman 2002; Hempel 1965; Strevens
2009) etc.—are not restricted to a causal interpretation. Therefore, there is already a widely
accepted set of features from which this alternative (and perhaps pluralistic) account of
explanation can be constructed. In order to lay some groundwork for this project, I will provide
some suggestions for how features of Batterman’s (2002b) account of asymptotic explanations
can be combined with features of Woodward’s (2003) account of explanation.
To begin, my account of idealizations in optimality models agrees with many of the
features emphasized by Batterman’s account (Batterman 2002a, 2002b, 2005, 2009). Batterman
identifies two features of what he calls ‘universal behavior’:
1.

The details of the system (those that would feature in a complete causal-mechanical
explanation of the system’s behavior) are largely irrelevant for describing the behavior of
interest.

2.

Many different systems with completely different “micro” details will exhibit the identical
behavior. (Batterman 2002, 73).

The key to explaining these universal behaviors, Batterman argues, is often to utilize
idealizations (e.g. the thermodynamic limit) in order to show that the heterogeneous details of the
systems are irrelevant for the occurrence of the repeatable phenomenon. For example, “[i]n order
to understand why the thermodynamic laws and relationships hold for a variety of physically
distinct types of systems, we require a method that allows for a systematic abstraction from the
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details that distinguish the different systems—the realizers—from one another” (Batterman,
2002, 124). By showing how the use of limits is sometimes essential to this process, Batterman
provides tools for understanding how idealizations can provide information about why the causal
details of different systems are not important for understanding the phenomenon of interest. In
addition, Batterman’s account shows how idealizations are sometimes key to providing the
generality we want. The idealized model explains the repeatable phenomenon by showing that
the phenomenon depends on a few dominant features of the system—e.g. the critical exponent—
and that this behavior is independent of various changes in the causal details of the system.
Without these idealizations the explanation of this universality disappears. However, one thing
that is key to add to Batterman’s account of idealization is an account of why the resulting
mathematical relationships are able to provide sufficient explanations.39
At this point, James Woodward’s account of explanation is extremely useful. According to
Woodward, an explanation can be understood as providing information about a pattern of
counterfactual dependence between the explanans and the explanandum (Woodward 2003, 11).
This involves answering questions about “what-if-things-had-been-different” or “w-questions”.
Accordingly, “[an] explanation must enable us to see what sort of difference it would have made
for the explanandum if the factors cited in the explanans had been different in various possible
ways” (Woodward 2003, 11).
Although I like much of Woodward’s account of explanation, I disagree with his
requirement that these counterfactual relations be understood along strictly manipulationist or
interventionist lines. The requirement that these counterfactuals must enable one to, in principle,
intervene in the system restricts Woodward’s account to specifically causal explanations.40
However, I think it is a mistake to require that all scientific explanations must be causal. Indeed,
if one looks at many of the explanations offered by scientific modelers, causes are not
mentioned. Furthermore, as I have argued here, there are several cases in which a causal
interpretation of the key explanatory relationships is inappropriate. One response is to try and
expand our notion of causation in order to capture these cases. However, I suggest an alternative
approach. Rather than expanding our account of causation far beyond our metaphysical
intuitions, I suggest that we simply distinguish the question of what causation is from the
question of what explains.41 In line with this suggestion, Woodward himself appears to admit
that perhaps not all explanations are causal and suggests a way that his account might be
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expanded to include these additional cases:
One natural way of accommodating these examples is as follows: the common element in many
forms of explanation, both causal and noncausal, is that they must answer what-if-things-hadbeen-different questions. When a theory tells us how Y would change under interventions on X,
we have (or have the material for constructing) a causal explanation. When a theory or derivation
answers a what-if-things-had-been-different question but we cannot interpret this as an answer to a
question about what would happen under an intervention, we may have a noncausal explanation of
some sort. (Woodward 2003, 221)

In precisely this way, we can retain Woodward’s emphasis on providing information about
counterfactuals without requiring that these be causal counterfactual relations. That is, the
counterfactual requirement on explanations is independent of the causal (i.e. interventionist)
requirement. Indeed, in light of the previous discussion, I contend that in some cases
counterfactual information can be explanatory without tracking any relationships of causal
dependence.42
In addition, I maintain that explanations (of at least many explananda) ought to provide
two kinds of counterfactual information by showing us both what is and is not important for
understanding the target phenomenon.43 This two-part requirement is why we require pieces
from Batterman’s account as well. In many cases, idealizations are essential to providing
important counterfactual information about why causes are irrelevant for describing the
behavior of the system(s). However, an explanation should also tell us about what features of the
system(s) the explanandum does depend on. Here the model’s representation of counterfactual
relationships—that are sometimes noncausal—is the key to showing what is important.
Together these components are able to demonstrate a kind of invariance (another key
feature of Woodward’s account). In the case of noncausal explanations, the model (typically)
shows how certain noncausal relationships between the explanans and the explanandum are
invariant with respect to changes to the causes of the system(s). This kind of invariance is
especially important for answering a particular type of why question—e.g., why do we see this
phenomenon repeated across extremely causally heterogeneous systems? A satisfactory answer
involves showing both what the phenomenon depends on as well as why it does not depend on
the causes that are heterogeneous among those systems. So although there are plenty of why
questions that require accurate representation of causes, in many cases we are interested in
answering why questions about phenomena that are repeatable over extremely causally
heterogeneous systems—and these why questions often require a different kind of answer.
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8. Conclusion.
I have argued that many optimality models provide highly idealized equilibrium explanations
despite the fact that they do not accurately represent causes. Moreover, in many cases, it is in
virtue of not accurately representing causes that optimality models are able to provide a better
explanation than competing causal models. Consequently, our account of explanation and
modeling must expand beyond the causal approach. I have also suggested ways in which this
expanded account might be constructed. Explanations should provide two kinds of counterfactual
information by showing us both what is and is not important for understanding the target
phenomenon. Idealizations are often essential to a model’s ability to provide this information;
e.g. when systems’ causes are irrelevant to understanding the phenomenon. In addition, idealized
models often explain by representing noncausal invariance relationships. Our revised account of
explanation and modeling must incorporate these features if it is to provide an adequate account
of how idealized mathematical models provide explanations—especially in biology.
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1

Optimality modeling also includes game-theoretic modeling. Game-theoretic models are often referred to as
“frequency dependent” optimality models since the payoffs to different strategies will depend on the frequency of
strategies in the population.
2
Other salient examples include Craver (2006) and Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000). In some places,
Woodward (2003) allows that not all explanations must be causal. I will discuss the ability of Woodward’s account
to accommodate noncausal explanation in more detail in the final section of this paper.
3
Precisely which causes must be included in an explanation is determined either by some account of causal
difference making (Strevens 2009), or by the contextual interests of the investigator (Potochnik 2007).
4
Of course, every model will be accurate with respect to certain features of its target system(s) and inaccurate with
respect to others. However, on Strevens’s account, the partial representation of an idealized model may still be an
explanation if the model veridically represents core causal factors that make a difference (Strevens 2009, Ch. 8).
Weisberg (2007, 2012) also includes this kind of veridical representation requirement in his account of minimalist
idealization.
5
Another salient example is Kaplan and Craver’s claim that in order for a model to explain “will involve describing
the underlying component parts, their relevant properties and activities, and how they are organized together
causally, spatially, temporally and hierarchically” (Kaplan and Craver 2011, 605).
6
Recently, causal approaches have taken more seriously the challenge of certain kinds of idealizations that eliminate
irrelevant causal factors (Strevens 2004, 2009). These responses, however, fail to account for cases in which causes
that are relevant to the explanandum are excluded or drastically distorted. Indeed, I will argue that in some cases a
model that provides an explanation fails to accurately represent any causes.
7
Italics in original.
8
In biological contexts, fitness (or inclusive fitness) is the ideal currency, but often a more easily measured currency
is used—e.g., average energy intake.
9
These are often referred to as the strategies’ “payoffs”.
10
Of course, many optimality models are not used to provide an explanation. However, these alternative uses,
though important, are outside the focus of this paper.
11
For instance, if most of the population is foraging in one area, it might be better for an individual to forage
elsewhere where there will be less competition.
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12

There are, of course, several different ways that equilibrium and evolutionary stability get defined. However, I
will not be concerned with those differences here since my arguments rely only on the general fact that these models
explain by showing that a particular strategy (or set of strategies) is the system’s equilibrium point.
13
Importantly, these requirements preserve a version of the accuracy requirement.
14
These examples are chosen with this goal in mind rather than for their status as well confirmed models.
15
I emphasize this here because these models are often misleadingly presented, or at least motivated, in terms of
decisions faced by individual organisms. However, within the model, individuals are only represented in the
aggregate and the payoffs to a strategy are the average payoffs to individuals with that phenotypic trait.
16
This kind of analysis was initially used in economics to determine the optimal strategy for investing limited
resources.
17
That is, additional copulation time brings smaller and smaller increases in the average number of eggs fertilized
18
Indeed, Sober (2000) cites Parker’s model as meeting a more rigorous standard for testing optimality models.
19
Although I am unable to discuss these cases here, optimality models are also widely used in economics to explain
the behavior of firms, markets, and other economic systems. In fact, economics relies so heavily on optimization
models that some economists have claimed that microeconomics just is the study of optimization under constraints
(or scarcity). For example, Pindyck and Rubinfeld begin their microeconomics textbook by claiming:
“Microeconomics describes the tradeoffs that consumers, workers, and firms face, and shows how these tradeoffs
are best made” (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2009, 4). Optimality models are essential for this kind of analysis. There are,
however, some important differences between economic optimality explanations and biological optimality
explanations (thanks to an anonymous reviewer for helping me notice some more of them). As a result, a detailed
analysis of economic optimality explanations will have to be provided in another paper.
20
In addition, the male-female tradeoff remains essential even when various underlying assumptions of Fisher’s
model are changed (Hamilton 1967).
21
Later on, Strevens makes it explicit that the key to explaining stable ecological patterns is to fill in the causal
mechanisms (Strevens 2009, 168-75). According to Strevens, an ecological model that represents features that are
multiply realizable without specifying the causal mechanisms of the system merely “functions as an explanatory
template, to be filled out in different ways to obtain deep explanations of stability in different ecosystems” (Strevens
2009, 170).
22
One problem is that measuring this kind of “p-generality” (Matthewson and Weisberg 2009) is notoriously
difficult, but a comparison of p-generality is possible in many cases.
23
Jackson and Pettit claim that this kind of modal information is given by a macrocausal explanation and tie the
explanatoriness of the information to Lewis’ (1986) causal account. I don’t want to endorse this interpretation of the
macro-level explanations, but I do agree with Jackson and Pettit about what the explanatorily relevant modal
information is in this case.
24
In this section I will usually refer to causal mechanisms, but the arguments apply equally well to considerations of
causal processes, or causal relationships more generally. In other words, these arguments are not restricted to
mechanistic accounts of causal explanation.
25
These distortions are tolerable because the model is only intended to capture the basic constraints and tradeoffs
between these variables at the level of the population. That is, they are intended to capture constraints, tradeoffs and
fitness differences that range over aggregates—they are not meant to accurately describe the causal processes acting
on individuals within in the population.
26
Indeed, one difficultly in constructing biological optimality models is that there is often impossible to tell what
phenotypic strategies were available in the past history of the population. This is often taken to be a serious obstacle
to optimality modeling. However, perhaps by understanding how this idealization contributes to the explanation of
the model, this objection can be mitigated somewhat.
27
An interesting thing to note about the assumption of infinite population size is that drift is intimately related to
natural selection. Indeed, the original interpretation of drift is as the statistical error term (Walsh, 2010) and many
have defended a statistical interpretation of fitness that entails that selection and drift cannot be pulled apart as two
separate causal processes (Matthen and Ariew 2002, 2009; Walsh et al. 2002; Walsh 2007, 2010). I will not commit
myself one way or the other on this issue, but it is worth noting that if selection and drift are inseparable in the way
suggested by the statistical view, then one cannot assume infinite population size without consequently distorting
the representation of the entire evolutionary process. Importantly, recognizing this complication does not require
endorsing the statistical view of selection and drift. The key insight is that the evolutionary processes that unfold
within biological systems are often extremely complex and causally interdependent. Therefore, idealizations that are

31

introduced to eliminate specific parts of a process—e.g. assuming infinite population size in order to eliminate
drift—will likely result in a distortion of the model’s representation of other parts of the process as well.
28
As before, this analysis is not intended to suggest that an increase in generality always makes optimality models
objectively better than less general models (contrary to the kind of view defended in Potochnik 2007, 2010).
Sometimes in science we want generality, other times we desire more detail. However, in many cases, our interests
will dictate that the explanandum is best explained by a more general optimality explanation. In these cases, the
pervasive use of idealizations that eliminate the causal details of real-world systems is part of what allows biological
optimality explanations to provide the kind of explanation we seek.
29
Italics added.
30
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for helping me clarify this point.
31
One reason I choose this option rather than canvassing the details of the various extant causal accounts of
explanation is because I largely agree with Cartwright (2004) that none of our current accounts are able to provide a
universal analysis of causes. A more salient reason is that I do not have a particular account of causation (or causal
explanation) to offer and so I hope not to bias my analysis towards considerations of one account or another.
32
In addition, Mitchell points out that, “Many biological systems display features of dynamical complexity
including bifurcation, amplification, and a type of phase change” (Mitchell 2012, 181).
33
As a specific example, Jay Odenbaugh notes that in ecology, “[I]t is extremely difficult to manipulate ecological
systems in systematic and controlled ways. There are multifarious factors at work and only some of them are
recognized at any given time” (Odenbaugh 2005, 233).
34
In addition, given that optimality models provide very limited accurate information about the causal dynamics that
led to the explanandum, they will usually provide almost no information about how the system would behave under
an intervention of this kind. Indeed, in order to establish this kind of modularity (or interventionist) claim requires a
great deal of additional causal information about the system—information that is usually extremely difficult (if not
impossible) to acquire for evolving biological systems.
35
For some additional examples see (Pincock 2012). In Chapter 7, Pincock discusses how idealized mathematical
models can lead us to mischaracterize the interconnectedness of different aspects of the real-world system.
36
This result should be a liberating for modelers in biology and economics. Given the causal complexity of the
target system(s) it is often extremely difficult to identify the causes that would enable us to effectively intervene on
the system. Moreover, given the number of idealizations involved in biological and economic models it is rarely the
case that we have an accurate representation of the causal relationships. Still, these highly idealized equilibrium
models can explain a wide range of phenomena without having to accurately represent causal relationships.
37
For example, Stephens and Krebs claim that: “Foraging theorists have tried to find general design principles that
apply regardless of the mechanisms used to implement them. For example, the elementary principles of a device for
getting traffic across a river—that is, a bridge—apply regardless of whether the bridge in question is built of rope,
wood, concrete, or steel” (Stephens and Krebs 1986, 10).
38
Philippe Huneman has recently used similar language to describe ‘topological explanations’, that “abstrac[t] away
from causal relations and interactions in a system, in order to pick up some sort of ‘topological’ properties of that
system and draw from those properties mathematical consequences that explain the features of the system”
(Huneman 2010, 214).
39
This is not to suggest that Batterman fails to answer this question. However, since this is not his main focus in
analyzing asymptotic reasoning, filling in some additional details provides a fruitful expansion of his account.
40
Woodward makes this restriction explicit: “[T]he theory I will be developing is restricted to causal explanations.
To the extent that there are forms of explanation that are noncausal, …they will be outside the scope of my
discussion” (Woodward 2003, 187).
41
Another way to put the same point is that if we continue to expand the notion of causal explanation we arrive at a
point where telling us that the explanation is causal is not informative.
42
Indeed, as Bokulich (2011, 2012) suggests, I think we can distinguish different kinds of explanation by the kinds
of counterfactual dependence involved. However, Bokulich’s account requires that “in order for a model M to
explain a given phenomenon P, we require that the counterfactual structure of M be isomorphic in the relevant
respects to the counterfactual structure of P” (Bokulich 2011, 39). In contrast, on my account, models can provide
the relevant counterfactual information without meeting this further condition of isomorphism. One reason for this is
that many models that are thought to provide explanations will fail to be isomorphic with the dependencies within
their target system(s) (Weisberg 2012). Consequently, my view allows the dependence relations of an explanation to
hold between variables or entities that are only “theoretical constructs”, or can only be discerned within the fictional
world of the highly idealized model—e.g. in an infinitely large population mating randomly. Bokulich (2011, 2012)
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does allow “fictional” models to explain, but it is unclear how this can be made to work with her requirement that
the structural dependencies be isomorphic to those in the real world. In short, I maintain that models can provide
counterfactual information about what is relevant and irrelevant without having to meet any additional “isomorphic
mapping” or “veridical representation” requirements between the dependencies in the model and the counterfactual
structure of the phenomenon. In addition, Bokulich’s “structural model explanations” require that the “dependence
is a consequence of the structural features of the theory (or theories) employed in the model” (Bokulich 2011, 40). In
contrast, in the kind of optimality model explanations that are my focus here, the structural features in the model are
typically derived from observation, experimentation, or the imagination of the scientist; not from the theories
employed in the model (e.g. the theory of natural selection). So another important difference between Bokulich’s
view and my own is that I think an explanation can depend on structural relations even when those relations are not
structural features of the theory employed in a model.
43
Woodward’s later work echoes this requirement: “Good explanations should both include information about all
the factors which are such that changes in them are associated with some change in the explanandum…and not
include factors such that no changes in them are associated with changes in the explanandum” (Woodward 2010,
291).
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